December 2025 - Minaz Jivraj My Take: The Children-Targeting Machine: How “764” Thrives in Plain Sight
- Minaz Jivraj
- Dec 9
- 6 min read
Updated: Dec 10
“764” is not a single website or hierarchical gang; it is a shifting, transnational constellation of invite-only chat servers, gaming contacts and encrypted channels that investigators, reporters and child-protection agencies tie to large-scale sextortion, grooming, livestreamed cruelty and, in some documented cases, coerced violence and suicide. The network’s decentralised design lets it splinter, rebrand and migrate across platforms (Discord, Telegram, Roblox, Minecraft, Instagram and others), complicating moderation and prosecution. Law enforcement in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere has mounted coordinated investigations and prosecutions; platform takedowns happen, but the underlying recruitment methods, behavioural “economy” and technological evasions persist.
What “764” actually is; and what it isn’t
Reporting and law-enforcement filings describe “764” as a decentralised, online subculture rather than a single website or rigid command structure. It comprises invite-only Discord and Telegram servers, gaming contacts and smaller “subgroups” (for example, variants reported as “764 Inferno”). Membership, roles and influence are distributed: there are facilitators, moderators and many participants; when specific accounts or servers get shut down, the community often reconstitutes under new names or on new platforms. This resilience is central to why takedowns alone do not stop the harm.
Why this distinction matters: treating 764 like a single “site” underestimates its capacity to fragment, migrate and preserve the techniques; grooming, coercion and the “content economy”, that sustain it. Investigative teams have repeatedly documented the same behavioural patterns reproduced in different places, which shows it’s a cultural and operational phenomenon more than a single criminal enterprise.
How the network recruits, controls and monetises abuse
Investigations and victim accounts converge on a repeatable sequence of tactics:
Hunting grounds: Members scout mainstream platforms and games frequented by minors; Roblox, Minecraft, Instagram, TikTok and public game chats, that isolate vulnerable youths, including those visiting mental-health or suicide-support forums.
Grooming and trust building: Perpetrators pose as friends, peers or romantic partners (often younger-looking accounts), then escalate requests gradually; normalising secrecy and tiny “missions” that mirror game mechanics (levels, rewards, badges). The gamified framing lowers victims’ alarm and fosters compliance.
Sextortion and blackmail: Abusers obtain compromising imagery or recordings (by coaxing victims to send them, or by coercion) and threaten exposure to family/friends unless victims produce more extreme material or follow orders. These threats are internal currency: users who procure shocking content gain status and access to more exclusive channels.
Escalation into violence and livestreamed abuse: Some channels demanded self-harm, animal cruelty or violent acts; material is livestreamed or filmed and circulated as “trophies” or lorebooks. Prosecutors and journalists have documented cases where coercion contributed to suicide or grave violence.
Operational security: The community uses burner accounts, private invites, encrypted messaging and constant rebranding to evade detection and moderation. When leadership is arrested, splinter cells often preserve methods and members.
These steps are not theoretical: they are repeatedly reconstructed from seized message archives, survivor interviews and law-enforcement affidavits.
Concrete, verifiable examples (what the public record shows)
Below are representative and documented cases drawn from official releases and investigative reporting.
Large-scale investigative exposés: WIRED, The Washington Post and partner outlets published multi-article investigations in 2024 that traced grooming, sextortion and organised sharing of abusive material across platforms. These pieces used message archives, platform data and interviews with victims and investigators.
Federal indictments and DOJ public statements: The U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Attorney’s Offices have charged individuals described as members or leaders of 764 or subgroups (for example in April and October 2025 press releases). Charges include child sexual exploitation, extortion, cyberstalking, interstate threats and, in some filings, conspiracy or violent-extremist-adjacent allegations reflecting the network’s terrorising aim.
High-profile arrests across borders: Press agencies reported arrests in Greece and the U.S. (e.g., Leonidas Varagiannis arrested in Greece, Prasan “Trippy” Nepal in North Carolina in April 2025) tied to leading a subgroup called “764 Inferno.” Reuters and other outlets covered these charges and the claim that defendants directed violent exploitation channels.
Documented harm to minors: Multiple news investigations and law-enforcement filings link 764-style coercion to suicides and severe self-harm. The Washington Post and AP reporting include case narratives of minors coerced into self-harm or who died following pressure from online abusers.
Sentencing of facilitators: U.S. prosecutions connected to the broader phenomenon have produced substantial sentences (for example, reporting documents multi-decade sentences for defendants convicted of leadership or exploitation offences). Media coverage and court records show prosecutors seeking heavy penalties to reflect the systemic harms.
Why platforms struggle to stop it
Platforms face three interacting barriers:
Design and user incentives: Games and social apps use reward loops and private channels that can be repurposed for grooming. Children recognise and accept gamified “missions,” making manipulation look like play.
Technical limitations and privacy trade-offs: Encrypted messaging, invite-only servers and cross-platform migration hinder automated detection. Moderation often focuses on explicit imagery, but 764’s harms also arise from coercive behaviour and threats — patterns harder to detect algorithmically.
Resource asymmetries: Platforms vary widely in trust-and-safety staffing and in their willingness/ability to share data quickly with investigators across borders. Investigators repeatedly call for faster cross-platform cooperation and better forensic access in serious cases.
What law enforcement is doing; and the limits
What’s happening: Multinational investigations (FBI, DOJ, Europol partners, RCMP and national police units) have coordinated arrests, seized digital evidence and pursued federal indictments. Prosecutors have at times used conspiracy and enterprise statutes to reflect organised behaviour across borders.
Limits and difficulties: Evidence collection is complex (many platforms, encrypted channels), victim care is resource-intensive, and prosecution must bridge local criminal statutes with multinational evidence sharing. Arrests of leaders produce disruption but rarely permanent eradication of the behavioural patterns or subcultural norms.
Practical, evidence-based steps (what helps right now)
For parents/caregivers
Talk openly and without shaming about private messaging, “missions,” and secrecy. Encourage kids to show; not delete, worrying messages. Practical guidance in the public record emphasises curiosity and preservation of evidence.
Know the platforms your children use: create observer accounts, review chat features and privacy settings, and ask schools what tools they use for learning.
If you suspect grooming or extortion, preserve screenshots, gather account information and contact law enforcement or national hotlines (NCMEC in the U.S., local police or national child protection lines elsewhere).
For platforms
Prioritise detection of coercive behavioural signals (not only imagery), speed up law-enforcement disclosure processes, and invest in cross-platform data sharing for serious criminal investigations.
For policymakers
Fund transnational investigative capacity, victim support services and trauma-informed examiner teams. Consider regulatory levers for faster evidence preservation and accountability when platforms repeatedly fail to act on systemic abusive patterns.
Open questions and research gaps
Prevalence vs. visibility: Investigative journalism has exposed many cases, but comprehensive prevalence studies (with privacy protections) are still sparse. We need systematic research on recruitment funnels, long-term survivor outcomes and the life cycle of splinter groups.
Ideology vs. sadism: Many members borrow extremist imagery, but the primary drivers in many documented cases appear to be sadism, status-seeking and reputational economy rather than a coherent political program. That hybridity complicates response options (counter-terror, child protection, or cybercrime frameworks).
Conclusion
The evidence is stark and consistent: 764-style networks are documented, dangerous and adaptive. Arrests and prosecutions show that disruption is possible and necessary, but dismantling the threat requires more than law enforcement alone; it requires platform design changes, sustained international cooperation, better victim support and informed, non-judgemental caregiving at home. The sources below give the primary documentation supporting each factual claim made here.
Sources:
U.S. Department of Justice - Member of Violent Extremist Network ‘764’ Charged with Animal Crushing, Sexual Exploitation of a Minor, Cyberstalking and Interstate Threats (Oct 27, 2025).
U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office (D.C.) - Leaders of 764 Arrested and Charged for Operating Global Child-Exploitation Enterprise (Apr 30, 2025).
U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Maryland - Indictment: Erik Lee Madison (Nov 20, 2025).
WIRED - There Are Dark Corners of the Internet. Then There's 764. (Mar 13, 2024).
https://www.wired.com/story/764-com-child-predator-network/
The Washington Post - On social media, a bullied teen found fame among child predators worldwide (Sep 9, 2024).
Reuters - Leaders of global online extortion and exploitation group 764 charged (Apr 30, 2025).
AP News - Police say a German man engaged in cybergrooming and pressured a US teen to kill himself (June 18, 2025).
https://apnews.com/article/germany-us-cybergrooming-arrest-4047eec634bb2cd52c15a2787126b8d3
ABC News - How the online extremist network 764 is threatening teen lives (Nov 18, 2025).
National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) - Using sextortion to groom kids for violence, pain (Aug 28, 2025).
https://www.missingkids.org/blog/2025/using-sextortion-to-groom-kids-for-violence-pain
Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) - From sextortion to violence: the evolving threat of the 764 network in the US (Nov 12, 2025).
Minaz Jivraj MSc., C.P.P., C.F.E., C.F.E.I., C.C.F.I.-C., I.C.P.S., C.C.T.P.
Disclaimer:The information provided in this blog/article is for general informational purposes only and reflects the personal opinions of the author. It is not intended as legal advice and should not be relied upon as such. While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the content, the author makes no representations or warranties about its completeness or suitability for any particular purpose. Readers are encouraged to seek professional legal advice specific to their situation.